I know that this stance has been refuted a long time ago, but I can’t help but enjoy the delightful symmetry of it.

Positivism generally defines reality as anything that we can sense, or to put it more vaguely and unnecessarily mystically, reality is whatever our consciousness experiences. Unfortunately, we don’t really have a good grasp of what it actually means to sense something, nor do we have a reasonable definition of what it means to be conscious (after all, even an inanimate rock will score a 3 on the Glascow Coma Scale.)

Which brings us back to a para-Lacanian point-of-view: reality is something that language cannot describe. Meaning that if you can describe it, what you’re describing is probably not real.

The thing is, this fits neatly with my notion that reality always lies in between whatever black-and-white delineations we can posit. Particle or wave. Good or evil. Ideal empiricism versus unrepentant solipsism.

On the other hand, this position is completely falsifiable if we ever figure out a way to rigorously (mathematically) define what it means for something to be conscious. If we can describe this, then we can describe what sensory input actually means, and from there, the rest of reality can be accounted for.